fraud

NFC Relay Fraud and Remote Access Malware: The Device as an Attack Surface

November 3, 2026 4 min read
NFC Relay Fraud and Remote Access Malware: The Device as an Attack Surface

A phone call lasting approximately 13 minutes was enough to deploy a malware chain and carry out multiple financial operations from a victim's phone.

In August 2026, Group-IB researchers documented a campaign targeting mobile banking users in Europe. The attackers impersonated bank employees and persuaded victims to install a malicious application on their Android devices. Behind the app were two threats with different capabilities: SpyNote, a remote access trojan (RAT), and WindRelay, malware designed to relay payment card data through NFC.

This case demonstrates how social engineering, remote device control, and the manipulation of payment technologies can be combined in a single fraud operation.

An Attack Built Around Two Components

The first component was SpyNote, a remote access trojan that allows attackers to control a compromised device. In the documented campaign, victims received a call from someone posing as a bank employee and were guided through installing an Android application outside official distribution channels.

Once installed and granted the necessary permissions, SpyNote allowed the attacker to access the phone and remotely deploy a second application: WindRelay.

The second component involved NFC relay. WindRelay is designed to capture the data exchange that occurs when a contactless payment card is brought close to the infected device and transmit that communication in real time to a device controlled by the criminals.

During the attack, victims were instructed to place their physical payment cards near their phones and enter their PINs. Meanwhile, the attackers relayed the NFC communication to another device, which could then be used to carry out fraudulent transactions at a payment terminal or, in certain cases, a compatible ATM.

The operation also allowed the criminals to access the victim's legitimate banking application and apply for a loan in the victim's name.

The phone call was not a secondary part of the attack. It served as a coordination channel, keeping the victim engaged and following instructions while the attackers carried out each stage of the fraud.

Why a Correct Password Is Not Enough to Stop This Attack

In this scenario, the objective is not necessarily to steal credentials or directly bypass the bank's authentication mechanisms.

Instead, the attacker seeks to control the device the customer uses to access banking services. They can operate the legitimate banking application and take advantage of a session accessed through remote control of the compromised phone.

This changes the detection perspective.

If security controls focus primarily on validating usernames, passwords, and initial authentication, they may not have enough information to recognize that someone else is operating the device.

The credentials may be valid. The application may be legitimate. The victim may even appear to be interacting directly with the phone. Yet the context of that activity has changed.

The risk is not only about who logs in, but also who controls the device and how the interaction is taking place.

NFC and the Challenge of Real-Time Relay Attacks

Near Field Communication (NFC) enables wireless data exchange between devices in close proximity. It is used, among other applications, to facilitate contactless payments.

Modern payment cards incorporate cryptographic mechanisms, such as dynamic transaction cryptograms, which help prevent transaction data from being reused simply by copying it.

However, an NFC relay attack presents a different challenge.

Rather than trying to decrypt or permanently clone a card, the attacker attempts to relay the communication between the card and a remote device in real time. This allows them to exploit a legitimate exchange to attempt a transaction elsewhere.

This technique is known as NFC relay fraud. It is also associated with the term ghost tapping, which is used to describe forms of fraud in which card communications are relayed to make payments without the cardholder being physically present at the point of sale.

Speed is essential. The communication must be maintained throughout the exchange required to complete the transaction, leaving a limited window in which to detect and stop the fraud before authorization.

A New Development in the Evolution of Mobile Banking Malware

The WindRelay case was documented in Europe and should not be interpreted as evidence that the same campaign is operating in Latin America. However, it emerged against a regional backdrop in which mobile banking threats already represent a significant challenge.

According to Kaspersky's Threat Landscape 2025 report, 1.8 million banking Trojan attacks were blocked in Latin America between August 2024 and June 2025, averaging approximately 5,000 per day.

This represented a 45.5% decrease compared with the previous period. Nevertheless, the report also identified changes in the mobile threat landscape: three active Android banking Trojan families were among the main threats observed, compared with one in the previous period.

The report also highlights the use of remote administration tools to access and manipulate banking applications on compromised devices.

These figures do not specifically refer to NFC relay attacks. However, they help illustrate a broader challenge: the smartphone has become an environment where user identity, credentials, financial applications, and transaction authorization mechanisms all converge.

Protecting mobile channels therefore requires considering not only threats designed to steal information, but also those that attempt to control the environment from which financial transactions are initiated.

The Device as the First Layer of Risk Assessment

When an attack originates on the customer's device, security strategies must account for signals that can be identified before a session begins and monitored throughout its lifecycle.

An assessment of the mobile environment may consider factors such as:

  • Device integrity: Identifying signs of root access, emulators, or modifications that may compromise the security conditions of the device.
  • Application integrity: Detecting indications that a banking application has been manipulated or altered.
  • Remote access tools: Identifying signals associated with remote-control applications, automation tools, or activity that may indicate a third party is operating the device.
  • Session behavior: Analyzing changes in activity, interaction patterns, and conditions that deviate from the user's usual context.
  • Transaction risk: Assessing each operation based on the available signals from the device, session, identity, and behavior.

These capabilities are not interchangeable, nor can they independently guarantee the detection of every type of malware. For example, a device without root access may still be compromised through an application installed by the user after being deceived into granting permissions.

For this reason, risk assessment must be continuous and combine multiple signals. An initial device check provides valuable context, but it does not replace session monitoring or the analysis of financial transactions.

Three Questions for Security and Fraud Prevention Teams

When facing threats that combine social engineering, remote access, and payment relaying, financial institutions should consider the following:

  • Device visibility: What information does the institution have about the device's integrity and security conditions before granting access?
  • Session monitoring: Can it identify signs of remote control, behavioral changes, or unusual activity after login?
  • Risk correlation: Is device and session information considered when assessing a financial transaction, or do security controls operate in isolation?

The SpyNote and WindRelay case highlights an important lesson: a transaction can be initiated through a legitimate application, using valid credentials and with the apparent participation of the customer, while a third party controls the environment.

Mobile fraud prevention requires looking beyond authentication. The device, session, and transaction are part of the same risk context, and each stage can provide signals needed to identify activity that may initially appear legitimate.

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